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Notes
Progress versus Protectionism: The
Double Taxation of Computer Software
in Korea
by
A=ILA FRBED*
In the wake of recent concessions made by the Republic of China
to stave off U.S. trade sanctions and to ensure American copyright-
based industries market access and intellectual property protection1 , it
is easy to overlook the transgressions of a somewhat lesser-known
player in the Asia/Pacific trade forum-the Republic of Korea. The
current problems created by Korea's trade practices certainly do not
approach the magnitude of those posed by China's. Nonetheless, an
examination of Korea's policies over the past decade and a look at its
more recent actions with respect to the importation and taxation of
computer software reveal a pattern of protectionism no less disheart-
ening from the perspective of copyright-based industries than the ram-
pant piracy and closed markets of its larger Asian neighbor. As Korea
continues to grow in economic stature in the world's marketplace,2 its
importation and taxation practices are likely to become increasingly
* J.D. Candidate 1996; B.A. 1991, University of California, Berkeley. I would like
to thank Professor Jay Clemens and all others who provided invaluable assistance and
encouragement in preparing this Note.
1. See generally Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor On A
U.S.-China Trade Agreement, Fed. News Serv. (Fed. Information Systems Corp.), Feb. 26,
1995 (discussing important provisions of the agreement); Release from the Office of the
Press Secretary, the White House, Statement by the President (Feb. 26, 1995) (China's work
to eliminate trade practices that have cost American exporters over $1 billion per year will
"mean thousands of jobs for Americans" in copyright-based industries).
2. Korea's rapid industrialization and increasing international prominence has led
some authors to dub it "tomorrow's power house" and "Asia's next giant." Robert W.
McGee & Yeomin Yoon, Technical Flaws in the Application of the U.S. Antidumping Law:
The Experience of U.S.-Korean Trade, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 259,264 (Summer 1994)
(citing Louis Kraar, Korea: Tomorrow's Powerhouse, FORTUNE, Aug. 15, 1988, at 75, 75
and ALicn H. AMSDEN, ASIA's NEXT GiAN. SouTH KOREA AND LATE INDusTRIALIzA-
TION (1989)).
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problematic for United States software concerns, which in 1994 alone
provided approximately $184 million in exports to Korea.3 In fact, for
the United States, Korea may be a pot just beginning to boil. A Feb-
ruary, 1995 article in the Wall Street Journal noted that trade disputes
between Washington and Seoul have simmered for almost a year, and
could conclude with sanctions under United States law.4 Among the
principal issues at the heart of these disputes is Korea's use of
nontariff barriers to effectively reduce the importation of American-
made computer software.5
This Note addresses transaction-based customs valuation and the
imposition of withholding taxes, two key measures that have been
used by the Korean government to erect barriers to market access for
foreign makers of computer software products. 6 Part I of the Note
provides an overview of the Korean government's trade record for the
past ten years, contrasting its repeated promises to open domestic
markets and reduce protectionism with concrete examples of its ef-
forts to discourage the importation of foreign goods and investment.
Part II discusses the application of Korea's unspoken protectionist
policies to the importation of computer software. Specifically, Part II
discusses Korea's practice of including the value of software data con-
tent in the calculation of customs duties. The author argues that this
practice is contrary to prevailing international standards for software
valuation and creates a substantial disincentive for foreign software
manufacturers seeking to market their products in Korea. Part III of
the Note examines the Korean taxing authority's policy of levying
3. U.S. Computer Software, Cigarettes, and Dogfood, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 29 at 1246 (July 19, 1995).
4. 4. Steve Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995,
at A8 [hereinafter Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea]; see also James Srodes,
Wall Street View: Kantor Scales the Trade Wall, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 12, 1995, at 5
(according to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, trade relations between the
United States and Korea "were at their lowest ebb in years" due to disputes over market
access for American farm, software, and telecoms products). Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, as amended by the Uruguay Round, allows the United States to institute retalia-
tory measures against countries that engage in discriminatory and unreasonable trade prac-
tices. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
5. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4; Srodes, supra note 4;
see also Sally Gelston, USTR Announces Watch Lists, 17 E. Asian Exec. Rep. (Int'l Exec.
Rep., Ltd.) No. 4, at 4 (April 15, 1995) (listing discriminatory customs valuation practices
and software piracy among the factors supporting Korea's placement on the USTR's prior-
ity watch list); USTR Announcement on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and
Intellectual Property Protection (Special 301), Executive Office of the President, Office of
the United States Trade Representative, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 791, 795 (May
3, 1995) (same).
6. For a thorough analysis of protectionist applications of U.S. law to imports of
Korean goods, see McGee & Yoon, supra note 2. The article explains that nontariff barri-
ers to trade between the United States and Korea by no means exclusively affect the sale of
American products in Korea, but may be inherent in our own policies and practices as well.
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withholding taxes on the revenue derived from certain software trans-
actions, including sales of pre-packaged, "off the shelf" products, local
access network ("LAN") transactions, and site licensing, thereby cre-
ating a second disincentive for foreign software manufacturers. Part
III also examines the current debate within the United States over the
proper tax characterization of such revenue and concludes that the
imposition of withholding taxes by both the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service and the Korean National Tax Administration is inappropriate.
Lastly, Part IV discusses the measures which the Korean government
should take to bring its customs valuation and taxation policies in line
with international standards, and describes recent efforts by U.S. offi-
cials and business leaders to address the software industry's concerns
in Korea.
L Korea's Trade Record
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") was created on January
1, 1995 to adjudicate disputes and enforce the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GAT"). According to the agreement establish-
ing the WTO, international trade "should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and ex-
panding the production of and trade in goods and services."' 7 The
GATr was designed to promote these objectives by substantially re-
ducing tariffs, creating uniform rules for the valuation of imported
goods, and eliminating nontariff trade barriers and discriminatory and
protectionist practices in international trade.8 Indeed, the GATr is
touted as an embodiment of the principles of free market economics,
insofar as contracting parties commit to open their markets to foreign
imports and investment, and to protect intellectual property rights of
foreign nationals.9
7. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in OFmcE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFIcE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL Acr
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF ME URUGUAY RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTI-
ATIONS: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 9 (April 15, 1994) [hereinafter
GATr].
8. See id. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, which ad-
dresses valuation of goods for customs purposes, was negotiated because of overall dissat-
isfaction with arbitrary and protective measures used in many countries as nontariff
barriers to international trade. See Dept. of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Statement
of Administrative Action, in CUSTOMS VALUATION UNDER THE TRADE AGREEMENTS Acr
OF 1979, at 68 (Oct. 1981). The Agreement created international rules for customs valua-
tion that promote uniformity, fairness and neutrality and eliminate the use of nontariff
protective measures by contracting parties to GATT. Id.
9. Helen Cooper & John Harwood, The Vote on GATT-The Rules Change: Major
Shifts in Trade are Ensured as GATT Wins U.S. Approval, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,1994, at Al.
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The Republic of Korea is a signatory to the GATT, as finalized in
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in April of
1994 (it was also a signatory to the original 1947 GATT). 1 Moreover,
Korea's former trade minister, Kim Chul Su, was a contender for the
post of director general of the WTO." By ratifying GATI and the
agreement establishing the WTO, Korea has pledged to uphold and
abide by the free market principles upon which these accords were
founded. This commitment is, on its face, consistent with the Korean
government's trade stance over the past decade, when it repeatedly
voiced its desire to liberalize its trade policies and facilitate the flow of
goods into the country. For instance, in 1991 the Korean government
launched a "charm offensive" of speeches, newspaper articles, and
luncheons to convince its trading partners (of whom the U.S. is the
largest' 2) of its commitment to open its domestic markets to foreign
trade.' 3 Claiming they had a "new attitude" toward international
trade due to the restructuring of the Korean cabinet, top trade officials
stated that they were attempting to re-educate those working-level of-
ficials who determined which products and services could be imported
into Korea in conformity with the government's more liberal trade
policies.14 Similarly, in March 1994, Seung-Soo Han, the Korean Am-
bassador to the United States, stressed Korea's "new open-door pol-
icy" in a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal. 15 According to
Han, Korea had become a "seasoned player" in international trade
with "an understanding that national economies are becoming in-
creasingly interdependent and that protectionism carries a high
10. HOUSE COMMS. ON INT'L RELATIONS & WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. SEN. COMMS. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS & FINANCE, 104TH CONG., IST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECO-
NOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACrCES 66, 68 (Joint Comm. Print Feb. 1995) [hereinafter
1995 COUNTRY REPORTS].
11. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4.
12. McGee & Yoon, supra note 2, at 264. Korea is the United States' eighth largest
trading partner. Id.
13. Damon Darlin, Koreans Indicate a New Willingness to Open Up Trade, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 18, 1991, at A9J [hereinafter Darlin, Koreans Indicate a New Willingness to Open
Up Trade]; see also Damon Darlin, Closing Door. South Korea Regresses on Opening Mar-
kets, Trade Partners Say, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1990, at Al [hereinafter Darlin, Closing
Door] ("Korea has promised repeatedly to open its markets to imports and to protect the
intellectual property rights of foreign companies.").
14. Darlin, Koreans Indicate a New Willingness to Open Up Trade, supra note 13. As
of 1993, these efforts had not met with much success. See Steve Glain, South Korea's Cut-
ting Edge is Dulled. Many Blame Overprotective, Autocratic Bureaucrats, WALL ST. J., Aug.
10, 1993, at A10 [hereinafter Glain, South Korea's Cutting Edge is Dulled] (Korea's civil
servants continued to follow the protectionist regime of past autocrats despite the govern-
ment's efforts at change).
15. Seung-Soo Han, Letters to the Editor: South Korea's New Open Door Policy,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1994, at A15.
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cost."'1 6 In accord with this understanding, Han stated that Korea was
"liberalizing [its] markets and expanding [its] .international coopera-
tion."' 7 Han acknowledged Korea's dependence upon foreign invest-
ment and technology transfers for its continued economic growth, and
claimed that Korea was eager to match its skilled work force and man-
ufacturing capabilities with American high technology.' 8
An analysis of Korea's trade practices over the past ten years
reveals, however, that the Korean government has been saying one
thing and doing another. While the government engaged in a consis-
tent campaign to curry favor with the United States and other trading
partners by promising to open up its domestic markets on the official
level, it engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to do just the oppo-
site-to erect tariff and nontariff barriers to the importation of goods
and technology, to protect its domestic industries from the threat of
competition, and to counterbalance the economic strain of lagging ex-
ports.' 9 Moreover, Korea has been getting away with this conduct be-
16. Id.
17. Id. See also U.S. SEN. COMMS. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & FINANCE, HOUSE
COMMS. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY
REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY A TRADE PRAcTICES 68, 69 (Joint Comm. Print Feb.
1994) [hereinafter 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS] (Korea's five year plan, released, in 1993
"promises a 'new Korea' of liberalized domestic and international policies").
18. Han, supra note 15.
19. Submission of the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, Ina to the Office of
the United States Trade Representative Concerning Intellectual Property Rights Protection,
at 35 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter IACC Special 301 Submission]; Information Technology As-
sociation of America, Special 301 Submission Relative to Korea, at 2 (Feb. 1995) (submitted
to the Office of the United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter ITAA Special 301
Submission]; Wang & Wang, Playing Hardball with Software: Korea's Shakedown of U.S.
Software Producers, at 2-3 (Feb. 1995) (submitted to the Office of the United States rade
Representative) [hereinafter Wang & Wang Brief] (The author contributed to the drafting
of the Korea sections of the IACC and ITAA Special 301 Submissions, and the Wang &
Wang Brief. Accordingly, some language may be replicated within the aforementioned
documents and this Note. All materials are on file with the HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL.).
See also 1995 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 10 (the Korean government's economic poli-
ies have emphasized domestic protectionism and "[r]estrictions on foreign participation in
the economy through trade and investment have been common."); Prepared Testimony of
the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Before the House
Subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific and on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the House Committee on International Relations, Fed. News Serv. (Fed. Information Sys-
tems Corp.), Feb. 2, 1995 ("While formal barriers to imports have fallen, Korea has raised
new, more subtle barriers that effectively prevent the liberalization envisioned under the
major trade policy initiatives of the late 1980s.").
The Wall Street Journal also reported in 1990 that foreign executives and trade offi-
cials felt dismayed in observing that the Korean government was "backtracking" on
promises to open domestic markets. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13. While there
were some signs of liberalization, Gilles Anouil, the ambassador to Korea for the Commis-
sion of the European Community ("EC"), stated, "when [the Koreans] open a door, some-
times they close another." Id Peter G. Frederick, the counselor for commercial affairs at
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cause the countries hardest hit by Korea's tactics-including the
United States-believe that pressuring the Korean government will
only further delay reform.20 As a result, Korea maintains one of the
most protected economies in Asia2 l , while enjoying the fruits of rapid
growth and the comparatively wide-open markets of its trading part-
ners.22 This is precisely the type of discrimination and protectionism
that GATT and the WTO are designed to abolish, and that Korea
committed to prevent as a party to these agreements.
According to an official in the U.S. Secretary of State's office,
most trade barriers erected by the Korean government are in areas
where the country's domestic industry is weak and unable to effec-
tively compete with foreign producers.23 Other factors, such as the
Korean public's reputed xenophobia and the unwillingness of many
the U.S. Embassy, voiced the U.S.'s concern over this "pattern of activity" by the Korean
government. Id.
20. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13 (quoting a U.S. State Dept. official who
stated, "We are still trying to get them to implement prior agreements, and taking on any
more changes might overload the [Korean] system."). It is also possible that the United
States' desire to maintain favorable political relations with the Republic of Korea, due to
its strategic position with respect to North Korea, has affected the American government's
decision not to apply undue pressure in the area of international trade.
21. IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 35; ITAA Special 301 Submission,
supra note 19, at 2; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 3. See also Robert Keatley,
World Economy: U.S. Tests Way to Solve Trade Disputes With Seoul, Progressing Little By
Little, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1994, at A6 ("South Korea began the [Dialogue for Economic
Cooperation] process with one of Asia's most protected economies; it's unclear just how
different it is today."); 1995 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 10, at 67 ("The South Korean
Government's economic policies have traditionally emphasized rapid export-led develop-
ment and the protection of domestic industries. Government intervention in the economy
to promote these objectives has been pervasive throughout the post-Korean war era.").
22. 1ACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 35; ITAA Special 301 Submission,
supra note 19, at 2; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 3. According to the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, between 1986 and 1991 Korea saw "double digit real growth." 1994 CouN-
TRY REPORTS, supra note 17, at 68. In 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported that Korea's
GNP was expected to grow more than 9%, which would make it the fastest growing econ-
omy in Asia, and possibly the world. Damon Darlin, South Korea Tries to Slow Down its
Economy as Inflation Increases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1991, at A9E [hereinafter Darlin,
South Korea Tries to Slow Down its Economy as Inflation Increases]. In 1992, Korea's
GNP rose only 4.7%, 1994 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 10, at 68, but it was still the
twelfth largest exporting country in the world, with approximately U.S. $80 billion in ex-
ports, Y.S. CHANG, KOREAN PATENT AND TRADEMARK LICENSING 1994 25 (1994). Eco-
nomic growth accelerated again in mid-1993, 1995 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 10, at
67, and in 1994, the Korean Ambassador to the U.S. reported that Korea was among the
world's 15 largest economies, Han, supra note 15.
23. Telephone Interview with Jim Zumwalt, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary
of State Dan Terrullo (Jan. 4, 1995). See also Antonio Mendoza, Promoting the Transfer of
U.S. Technology Across National Borders: The Enemy Within, 20 N.C. J. INT'L LAw &
CoM. REG. 97, 97 n.14 (Fall 1994) (listing increasing financial and economic stability, ex-
panding the domestic technology base, increasing employment, and protecting infant in-
dustries among the goals developing countries attempt to promote via trade regulation).
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bureaucrats to implement liberal policies decreed by their more open-
minded superiors for fear that changes will harm their careers, may
also result in protectionist practices. 24 Notable examples of the Ko-
rean government's efforts to reduce foreign imports and protect its
domestic markets are as follows:
(1) In early 1994, Korean customs officials seized a shipment of
American-made sausages valued at approximately U.S. $1.5 million.
The officials claimed these sausages were incorrectly classified over
the previous four years as goods with a 90-day expiration period,
when they should have been allowed only a 30-day expiration period
(conveniently, the approximate amount of time it took for the sau-
sages to reach Korea and undergo its lengthy customs process),25 The
sausages were declared illegal and were quarantined for months on
the docks of Pusan.26 A spokesman for Korean Importers of Ameri-
can Sausages, a trade organization, indicated that importers had com-
plied with all documentation requirements for the previous four years,
and that nothing changed until the Korean officials' sudden seizure of
the shipment.27 Both the importers and U.S. trade officials believed
that the seizure and new shelf-life restrictions, "which came without
warning," were a nontariff trade barrier erected by the Korean gov-
ernment to thwart importation in an expanding market (since 1990,
Korea had imported approximately U.S. $7.5 million in sausages, pri-
marily from the U.S.).2s
24. Keatley, supra note 21. See also 1994 CouNRmY REPORTS, supra note 17, at 69
("the bureaucracy can and often does frustrate efforts to implement change."); Glain,
South Korea's Cutting Edge is Dulled, supra note 14 ("[A] big obstacle [to change] is a fear
of foreign influences rooted in Korea's long history"). The Korean government has also
been reluctant to reform because of considerations of national pride and politics. See
James R. Schiffman, U.S. and South Korea Bicker Over Trade, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1985, at
Al (quoting one Korean official as stating, "We can't afford to look like we are kneeling to
U.S. pressure. That is the last thing we could do politically at home.").
25. Steve Glain, From Sausages to Autos, U.S. Products Still Face Trade Hurdles in
South Korea, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1994, at A13 [hereinafter Glain, From Sausages to
Autos]; see also U.S.-Korea Talks Called 'Constructive'; Some Questions Raised, U.S. Offi-
cial Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1039 (June 29, 1994) (indicating that the
issue of "prohibitively short" sausage shelf-life requirements was raised with the Korean
government in bilateral trade talks in June 1994). A similar incident occurred in 1992 with
a shipment of Mars Snickers chocolate bars and Skittles candy worth $250,000. Glain,
South Korea's Cutting Edge is Dulled, supra note 14. The Ministry of Health and Social
Services in Korea claimed the goods failed to comply with new guidelines concerning quar-
antine certification. Id. In fact, Mars, Inc. never even knew about the guidelines because
they had never been made public. Id.
26. Glain, From Sausages to Autos, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Korean government recently returned the shelf-life restriction on sau-
sages to 90 days in response to U.S. industry pressure. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers
with Korea, supra note 4. However, problems with shelf-life requirements for other im-
ported meat products have developed. United States meat exporters apparently object to
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(2) In June of 1993, Korean governmental officials arrested seven
representatives of the Amway Corporation and Sunrider International
without warning for allegedly engaging in illegal pyramid schemes. 29
Amway and Sunrider are companies that specialize in commission-
based door-to-door sales of household goods and herbal products.30
The officials claimed that these door-to-door direct-sales practices
were violative of the newly revised Door-to-Door Sales Act because
they were geared toward generating large profits in a short period of
time, after which the direct sales companies would leave the country.31
The officials also complained that such practices were poisoning the
Korean public's work ethic and damaging domestic industry by mov-
ing people away from more traditional, production-oriented jobs. 32
Although the Korean government released two of Amway's employ-
ees eight days after they were incarcerated, it detained the remaining
five company representatives without bail for a considerably longer
period of time, until the U.S. embassy succeeded in obtaining their
release. 33 Not surprisingly, the government's sudden crackdown on
Amway and Sunrider came at a time when the companies had seen a
"phenomenal" increase in sales in Korea-up to approximately U.S.
$1 billion in 1992, with a sales force of more than 100,000.34
(3) In 1990, the Korean government, concerned about lagging ex-
ports and skyrocketing imports, began an anti-import campaign that
"made life difficult for importers. '35 One example of the Korean offi-
cials' measures was "the case of [the] imported pecans."'36 Although it
is legal to import pecans into Korea, customs officials blocked ship-
ments of the nuts claiming they were infested with coddling moths-
an insect scientifically established not to live in pecans. 37 Despite this
the Korean practice of determining shelf life on a product by product basis, rather than
following the customary practice of relying on manufacturers' standards. U.S. -Korea Fric-
tions Continue Over Telecom, Meat Trade Issues, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 493,
494-95 (Mar. 15, 1995). The United States believes Korea's policies are "arbitrary and
trade-prohibitive." Id at 495.
29. Steve Glain, South Koreans Charge, Release Amway Agents, WALL ST. J., July 8,
1993, at A9 [hereinafter Glain, South Koreans Charge, Release Away Agents]; Glain, South
Korea's Cutting Edge is Dulled, supra note 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Time W. Ferguson, Business World. Citizen Capitalism and 'Door to Door'
Exports, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1993, at All.
34. Ferguson, supra note 33. Korea's direct sales law is being revised by legislators.in
response to Amway's heavy lobbying efforts. Glain, U.S. Dispute Simmers With Korea,
supra note 4.
35. See Darlin, South Korea Tries to Slow Down its Economy as Inflation Increases,
supra note 22.
36. Darlin, Koreans Indicate a New Willingness To Open Up Trade, supra note 13.
37. Id.
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scientific evidence, it took several members of Congress, the U.S. cab-
inet, and the American Embassy over a year to resolve the issue.38
(4) In 1990 the Korean government told Kia Motor Company, a
Korean affiliate of Ford, to stop importing Mercury Sables because
"Korea was importing too many foreign cars."'39 Shortly thereafter,
the Korean government announced an increase in the number of sub-
way bonds new car buyers were required to purchase, conspicuously
making the amount for buyers of foreign autos greater than for buyers
of domestic autos. 40 It also began ordering audits of drivers of im-
ported cars, and tightening such cars' exhaust test requirements. 41
These actions were inconsistent with Korea's promise to open its do-
mestic automobile market in 1987.42 According to the Wall Street
Journal, Korea's harassment of foreign car owners was part of a
greater campaign against foreign products that the Korean govern-
ment believed were damaging to its domestic market.43
(5) Additional examples of Korea's campaign against foreign
goods in 1990, despite its purported open-markets trade policy, in-
clude the government's imposition of high taxes and tariffs on items
such as Scotch, forcing up its resale price and making it "the most
expensive in the industrialized world";" its expansive classification of
luxury items (the importation of which was especially discouraged) to
encompass such non-luxury goods as Tupperware;45 and its failure to
promptly approve applications of foreign banks desiring to join the
Korean ATM network (for domestic banks, such as Donghwa Bank,
approval was issued within two weeks, but foreign banks such as Ci-
tibank were forced to wait substantially longer).46
38. Id.
39. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. In 1993, the Wall Street Journal called Korea's car market "the most protected
in the world." Glain, South Korea's Cutting Edge is Dulled, supra note 14.
43. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13. Another measure which has proved particu-
larly damaging to foreign car makers is Korea's import diversification policy, which re-
quires importers to cut back on imports from a given country and diversify their purchases
if the government decides that the volume of imports from that country is too high. Tele-
phone Interview with Jim Zumwalt, supra note 23. While this policy has affected Ameri-
can companies to a limited extent (particularly those companies that route their imports
through Japan), it is primarily geared toward Japanese car makers, and has proved to be a
formidable nontariff trade barrier. 1d. Japan is currently pressuring Korea to discontinue
this policy on the ground that it violates the GAIT and WTO Agreement. Id.
44. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13.
45. Id. See also 1994 CouNTRY REPoRTs, supra note 17, at 71: "Most Koreans have
been taught that imports are, by definition, luxury goods and somehow unpatriotic." The
Korean government has targeted consumer imports with regular "frugality campaigns" to
discourage their purchase. Id.
46. Darlin, Closing Door, supra note 13.
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As these examples indicate, the Korean government has engaged
in a consistent practice of utilizing nontariff measures-including the
imposition of criminal sanctions, apparent in the Amway incident-to
discourage foreign imports, particularly those it fears will adversely
affect its domestic markets, economic growth, or cultural and societal
values. Korea has persisted in claiming it wants to open its markets
and do away with its protectionist policies, but has done the opposite
for years,47 in direct contravention of its obligations under GATT and
the WTO Agreement.
H. Customs Valuation of Computer Software
A. Korea's Transaction-Based Valuation Policy
Korea's practice of relying upon nontariff measures to effectuate
its protectionist trade policies is particularly apparent in the steps it
has taken to dampen the importation of computer software48, a key
U.S. export.49 One of Korea's most damaging measures was changing
its policy with respect to the valuation of software for customs pur-
poses from the widely accepted international standard of charging du-
ties only on software "carrier media" (e.g., the diskette or magnetic
tape upon which software is stored), to the practice of charging duties
on the full transaction value of the software media and its data
content.50
47. As the director of one trading company said, "The Koreans say 'You can, you
can,' [but] [tihe reality is, 'You can't, you can't." Schiffman, supra note 24 (quoting Jack
Dodds, managing director of Woodward & Dickerson Far East Ltd.).
48. The use of customs valuation procedures as a nontariff barrier to the importation
of computer software is not unique to Korea. For an illuminating study of this problem in
Japan, see Dario Robertson, Customs Treatment of Software: The Duty-Free Dilemma, 7 E.
Asian Exec. Rep. (E. Asian Exec. Rep., Inc.) No. 8, at 7 (Aug. 15, 1985).
49. Copyright-based industries, including the software industry, are major players in
the United States economy. See Stephen E. Siwek & Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Economists
Incorporated, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: 1977-1993 (Jan. 1995) (copyright
industries are among the fastest growing commercial businesses in the U.S.) (on file with
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL); Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
On A U.S.-China Trade Agreement, supra note 1 (computer software is among the fastest-
growing and most competitive domestic industries). In 1993 alone, core copyright indus-
tries contributed approximately $238.6 billion to the U.S. economy, accounting for 3.74%
of the Gross Domestic Product. Siwek & Furchtgott-Roth, supra. They also employed
over 5.7 million people, comprising approximately 4.8% of the U.S. workforce. Id.
Software industry leaders have stated that their growth, including their ability to increase
domestic employment, is "dependent on [their] ability to export." Unofficial Transcript of
Select Revenue Measures Hearing, Part 111, 93 TAX NOTEs TODAY, June 30, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, TNT File (Statement of James Abrahamson, Chairman of the
Board of Oracle Corp.). In 1994, U.S. software makers exported $184 million in products
to Korea. See supra.
50. See generally International Intellectual Property Alliance, 1995 Special 301 Rec-
ommendations and Estimated Trade Losses Due to Piracy, at 50 (Feb. 13, 1995) (submitted
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In 1984, the GAIT Committee on Customs Valuation issued a
separate ruling (Decision 4.1) to address the issue of media versus
transaction-based valuation, recognizing "the unique situation"
software posed in interpreting the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of GATT.51 This move came in response to a ruling re-
quest by the United States in 1982, proposing that Parties to the
GAIT agree that the information component of software is nonduti-
able for customs purposes. 52 The Committee endorsed this position
exclusively in its proposed decision issued in January of 1983. It sub-
sequently modified the ruling, however, in response to a request by
the European Community to state that taxation of the full transaction
value of software is also acceptable.5 3
to the Office of the United States Trade Representative) (hereinafter "IIPA Submission")
[The author also assisted in the drafting of the Korea section of the IIPA Submission,
which is on file with the HASTNGS LAW JOURNAL.]; ITAA Special 301 Submission, supra
note 19, at 2; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 4; IACC Special301 Submission, supra
note 19, at 2. Transaction value is defined under the GATT as "the price actually paid or
payable for the goods when sold for export to the country of importation .... ." Agreement
on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in
GATT, supra note 7, at 172.
Perhaps the primary reason for Korea's discriminatory treatment of imported software
is the government's desire to protect its burgeoning domestic software industry from for-
eign competition. In addition, software products, particularly high end items, are a lucra-
tive source of tax revenue. See Michael E. Roll, Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United
States: Customs Appraisement and Middleman Pricing Under Section 402 of the Tariff Act
of 1930,17 FoRDHAM INmL. L. J. 190, 198-99 (1993) (prior to the Tokyo Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, the calculation of customs value was frequently used by countries
to generate increased revenue and protect domestic industries); John Borking, Import Du-
ties on the Value of Software from Non-EEC Countries, COMPUTER LAW & PRACICE No.
1, at 10, 14 (SeptJOct. 1985) (observing that some developing countries may use high cus-
toms duties to protect their domestic software industries).
51. U.S. Valuation of Imported Carrier Media Bearing Data or Instructions for Use in
Data Processing Equipment, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 299, T.D. 85-124 (July 8, 1985) (also pub-
lished in the Federal Register, 50 F.R. 30558-30559). Article VII of GATT addresses ac-
ceptable methods of computing the transaction value of goods for customs purposes. See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, in GATT, supra note 7, at 172-80.
52. Ronald Wellington Brown, Esq., Economic and Trade Related Aspects of Trans-
border Data Flow: Elements of a Code for Transnational Commerce, 6 Nw. J. OF INTL. LAW
& Bus. 1, 11 n.34 (Spr. 1984). The United States Customs Service has valued software
exclusive of its information component since the 1960s. United States Department of
Commerce International Trade Administration, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination: Certain Computer Aided Software Engineering Products from Singa-
pore, 55 FR 1596, 1598 (Jan. 17, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Dept. of Commerce Preliminary
Determination].
53. Brown, supra note 52, at 11 n.34, 14 n.44. It should be noted that although the
European Community requested the Committee to adopt this compromise position, no EC
member nation charges duties on the full transaction value of software. See U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF COMPUTERS & BusnEss EQuIPmENT, TAxnFs AND
OTHER TAXEs ON COMPUTER HARDWARF AND Sor'WARE 3 (May 1994) [hereinafter U.S.
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The United States proposal to tax software according to the cost
of the carrier media alone, as ratified by the Committee in Decision
4.1,54 has clearly become the prevailing international standard for
software valuation.5 5 Nearly every nation in the world that is a signa-
tory to the GAT accord excludes software data content from
dutiability.5 6
Widespread acceptance of the media-based valuation method is
due to the recognition of a number of considerations. First, because
of the digital nature of software, it can readily be transmitted across
international borders by "invisible means," such as telephone lines,
thereby avoiding customs altogether.5 7 Software can also be imported
on master disks and reproduced within the country of import, in which
case only the master tape is subject to duty.5 8 In light of these alterna-
tives, it is arbitrary and unfair to single out software imported via tan-
gible carrier media, such as diskettes, for imposition of substantially
DEPT. OF COMMERCE TARIFF SCHEDULE] (showing that EC nations exempt software con-
tent from dutiability and charge a 0% duty rate on software carrier media).
54. See supra notes 52 & 53.
55. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 53, at 3-15 (indicat-
ing that the vast majority of countries exclude software data content from dutiability);
IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 35 (media-only valuation is "used by the
great majority of the world's nations"); Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 1 (same).
56. See supra note 55. Moreover, all Asian nations, except India (which charges an
excessive 85% duty on software content) and China, charge duties on software media only.
U.S. DEr. OF COMMERCE TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 53, at 5-6. According to the
Tariff Schedule, Korea values software strictly according to its carrier media, reflecting the
U.S. government's belief that this was Korea's policy. Id at 5.
57. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 52, at 1598
(Congress identified telecommunications transmissions and similar "intangibles" as exempt
from the provisions of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule); Borking, supra note 50, at 11
(observing that import duties cannot be fixed when software is transmitted by telephone
lines or satellite channels). Korea does not levy tariffs on software imported electronically.
Woo Hyun Baik & William C. Choi, Korea: Computer Software Taxation, Asia Pac. Tax
Bull. 10, 16 (Jan. 1995).
58. See Yoong Neung Kee & Young-Cheol Jeong, Software Licensing Fees: NTA
Guideline on Withholding Tax; Licensors Need to Take Care in Structuring Their Marketing
Arrangements, 16 E. Asian Exec. Rep. (Int'l Exec. Rep., Ltd.) No. 3, at 7 (Mar. 15, 1994) (a
software importer may reduce customs duties by importing a master copy of software and
reproducing it locally). Most countries, including Korea, exempt royalties paid for the
right to reproduce software in the country of importation from customs duties. See Art. 3-
3, §1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Korean Customs Act (providing that royalties paid
for the right to reproduce software within Korea are not dutiable); Valuation No. 22740-
249 of the Central Customs Service (June 18, 1993) (same); Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at
16 (indicating that the license agreement should clearly specify the amount of royalties
attributable to the reproduction right to qualify for the exemption). Baik and Choi point
out that it makes little sense for Korea to exclude reproduction royalties but not sales
royalties from customs duties, given that software is ordinarily reproduced for purposes of
sale.
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higher duty rates based on the value of its content.5 9 This is especially
true in light of the fact that carrier media such as diskettes are ordina-
rily a mere temporary means of storing information until it is trans-
ferred to an end-user's computer.
Second, the imposition of duties on software content is tanta-
mount to the taxation of data, which is traditionally duty-free in order
to promote the free flow of information across international borders.60
As one U.S. official stated, the unimpeded global exchange of infor-
mation is of great importance:
Competition and the free flow of knowledge and ideas, regardless of
their popularity, are cornerstones of the industrialized nations of
the free world. ... To some extent all civilization has been built
upon the transfer of information from one person to another from
one generation to the next. We must guard against the inclination
to erect artificial barriers to information flows. 61
Moreover, maintenance of this international "information superhigh-
way" is of particular significance to American business interests:
59. See Borking, supra note 50, at 11 (noting the position of the European Association
of Manufacturers of Business Machines and Data Processing Equipment (EUROBIT) and
the Federation Europeenne des Importateurs de Machine de Bureau (FEIM) that, insofar
as software is "instructions" stored only temporarily on data carriers that can alternatively
be transferred by telecommunication lines, orally, by post, or on magnetic tape, it should
not be subject to import duties). According to Borking, the unfairness is magnified by the
fact that smaller companies often cannot afford to transmit software by phone lines or
satellite. Id These companies are forced to pay import duties on the full transaction cost
of software in Korea, while larger companies can import by alternative methods for free
(although for other reasons, such as concern over the misappropriation of know-how, it
may not be expedient to do so). Id The smaller companies would probably shift the ad-
ded costs to their customers, thereby distorting competition in the marketplace. Id The
equitable solution, Borking concludes, is to simply get rid of the import duties. Id.
60. For a detailed discussion of how Korean import taxes and U.S. export taxes affect
the flow of technology from the U.S. to Korea, see Chang Hee Lee, Taxation of U.S.-
Korean Technology Transfer: A Developing Country's Point of View, 10 Int'l Tax & Bus.
Lawyer No. 1, at 1 (Summer 1992).
Perhaps the classic examples of "information" exempted from customs duties to pro-
mote the international exchange of know-how and ideas are books and computer manuals.
These items are duty-free in the U.S. and Korea. See Tariff Schedules, Schedule 2, Part 5,
19 U.S.C. § 1202 (noting that books, newspapers, and periodicals are duty free in the U.S.);
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE TARiFF SCHEDULE, supra note 53 (listing a 0% duty rate for
computer manuals in Korea). Charging duties on the information component of software
is inconsistent with the practice of exempting books from dutiability, insofar as it discrimi-
nates between similar items based strictly on the format of the information contained
therein (e.g., words on a piece of paper versus a machine-readable data sequence).
Software is simply an advanced method of transmitting information from one source to
another, and should be accorded the same consideration as its more traditional
counterparts.
61. Brown, supra note 52, at 26 n.76 (quoting Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, before the OECD Committee for Information, Computer
and Communications Policy, Paris, France (Dec. 13, 1982)).
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The United States has a special interest in maintaining the free flow
of information.... Since the United States is currently the world
leader in information technology and trade, international restric-
tions on the information industry most likely will affect United
States business interests more than those of any other country.
There could be a severe reduction in the currently massive amounts
of United States revenue from the international information indus-
try if burdensome regulations decrease the utility of information ex-
change systems.62
Encouraging the flow of information across national borders will also
be beneficial for Korea, a nation still trying to build its technology
base and industrial infrastructure. Sophisticated foreign software can
aid in increasing the productivity and competitiveness of Korean com-
panies and can facilitate the development of Korea's own software
market.
Third, valuation of software data content may be a difficult and
speculative endeavor. 63 Indeed, the U.S. Customs Service's decision
to exclude software content from valuation was largely a result of the
"considerable difficulty" it encountered in attempting to place a price
on data.64 Customs believed that by excluding the information com-
ponent, it would create a more "fair, uniform, and neutral system for
the valuation of goods consistent with the objective of the GAT"
Committee [on Customs Valuation]. ' 65 The United States was clearly
not alone in this belief, as virtually every other Party to the GATT has
now adopted the media-only valuation practice.66
It should be noted here that the exclusion of software data con-
tent from customs valuation is not inconsistent with the treatment of
software stored on carrier media as a dutiable good.67 On the con-
trary, while software data itself is a form of intangible intellectual
property, once it is placed on a carrier medium such as a diskette, it
62. Jane A. Zimmerman, Transborder Data Flow: Problems with the Council of Eu-
rope Convention, or Protecting States from Protectionism, 4 N.W. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 601,
604 (Autumn 1982). See also Mendoza, supra note 23, at 98 ("promoting technology ex-
portation is profitable not only for U.S. companies, but for the U.S. economy as well.").
The international information "highway" is certainly important to the business interests of
other countries as well. For instance, a recent Associated Press release indicated that west-
ern European leaders' failure to embrace the "Infobahn" had "cost them millions of jobs,"
and that other countries slow on the uptake "could, in less than a decade, face disastrous
declines in investment and a squeeze on jobs." Associated Press, Europe Stuck in Slow
Lane: Few Roads Laid for Data Highway, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 1995, at B3.
63. See Borking, supra note 50, at 11-12 (one factor in favor of abolishing import
duties on software is the inability of customs authorities to accurately value data content).
64. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 52, at 1598.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 52, at 1597.
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takes on the characteristics of tangible merchandise. 68 In a 1990 Pre-
liminary Determination concerning the applicability of countervailing
duty law to computer software imported from Singapore, the United
States Department of Commerce likened software stored on carrier
media to books, newspapers, and magazines, insofar as these items
derive their value from their intangible components but are treated as
merchandise for customs purposes. 69 The Department of Commerce
also expressly stated that the U.S. Customs Service, in "imposing du-
ties on the basis of the recording area of the carrier medium without
regard to its software component.., treats such imports as merchan-
dise."' 70 Accordingly, although the U.S. Customs Service exempts
software data content from dutiability for the previously-stated rea-
sons, it does tax the physical carrier media on which the data is con-
tained.71 The author believes that charging duties on carrier media is
an acceptable practice and does not contest the Korean government's
right to use this method of taxation. However, the author does dis-
pute Korea's decision to change its valuation policy to charge duties
on software data content, insofar as this decision aligns Korea with a
small minority of nations that are out of step with prevailing interna-
tional standards. 72
B. Non-RTansparency of Policy
Korea's change in its software valuation policy came largely with-
out warning, since the Korean government failed to enact any laws or
regulations implementing the new valuation practice, or to otherwise
alert affected businesses of its existence.73 Many foreign importers
68. Id. The Department stated, "a tangible object which embodies intellectual prop-
erty is merchandise." AL
69. Id. at 1598.
70. Id. at 1597. The Department of Commerce listed six characteristics of software
which render it "merchandise" for customs purposes:
it is (1) A pre-packaged copyrighted software product that can be purchased off-
the-shelf, (2) Typically contained on a carrier medium, (3) A pre-written product
with broad application, which does not need additional servicing by the seller of
the software prior to use by the end-user, (4) Marketed similarly to other types of
merchandise, (5) Maintained in inventory by vendors, and (6) Treated differently
than non-recorded carrier media by the U.S. Customs Service.
Id at 1599. The Department of Commerce found these characteristics applicable even
though the software imported was not the final pre-packaged product, but rather master
disks used to produce the final product. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. ITAA Special301 Submission, supra note 19, at 2; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note
19, at 6. But cf. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 16, stating that the Korean Customs Tax
Law adopts transaction-based valuation for software. In fact, the Law merely restates the
provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Art. VII of GATT, which does not
refer to software specifically and cannot be said to settle the question of its proper valua-
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learned of the change only when they were subjected to an internal
audit by Korean Customs and charged with substantial fines for "back
duties." 74 One notable example of this is the case of Computer Asso-
ciates International, Inc., an American company accused in 1994 by
the Seoul Customs Office of failing to declare the proper transaction
value of software it had been importing into Korea since 1989.75 Cus-
toms officials raided the offices of the company's Korean subsidiary
and subjected its managers to lengthy interrogations and threats of
extended imprisonment, based on charges that it had intentionally
evaded over $1 million in customs duties by declaring only the media
value of its imported software.76 The company had operated in Korea
for several years, openly following the media-only valuation method,
believing that it was consistent with Korean practices. 77 Despite Com-
tion. See Borking, supra note 50, at 14 ("The status of software on importation is not clear
world-wide. The GATT Customs Value Code gives no assistance."). Given the uniqueness
of software, most other developed nations have published separate rules or regulations
setting forth their software valuation policies, whether they be transaction-based or based
on media-only. The need for such transparency is particularly necessary where, as in Ko-
rea, transaction-based valuation has been sporadically applied in practice. Korean Cus-
toms has issued internal guidelines stating that software content as well as media is
dutiable. Central Customs Service, Notification of Matters to be Attended to When Taking
in and Clearing Software Through Customs, Evaluation 22740-94 (Jan. 13, 1989); Wang &
Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 6. Such guidelines, however, are strictly for use by customs
officials and are unknown to the general business community. Wang & Wang Brief, supra
note 19, at 6. Moreover, such internal guidelines do not have the force of law in Korea. Id.
74. 1ACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 37; ITAA Special 301 Submission,
supra note 19, at 3; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 4. Foreign firms in other newly
"liberalized" industries, such as cosmetics, have also faced customs valuation audits as part
of a larger scheme to protect domestic businesses and discourage "luxury" imports. 1995
CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 10, at 70.
75. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4; IACC Special 301
Submission, supra note 19, at 34-35; ITAA Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 3;
Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 1-2. Computer Associates is the second largest
computer software company in the world. Unofficial Transcript of Select Revenue Meas-
ures Hearing, supra note 49.
A similar customs dispute arose in 1992 with Oracle Corp., the third largest computer
software company in the world. Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 5 n.8; ITAA Special
301 Submission, supra note 19, at 3; Unofficial Transcript of Select Revenue Measures Hear-
ing, supra note 49.
76. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4; IACC Special 301
Submission, supra note 19, at 34-35; ITAA Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 3;
Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 1-2.
77. Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4; IACC Special 301
Submission, supra note 19, at 34-35; ITAA Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 3;
Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 1-2. Indeed, the U.S. government itself believed that
Korea followed the media-only valuation method. See U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE TARIFF
SCHEDULE, supra note 53, at 5 (indicating that Korea charges a 9% duty rate on software
carrier media only). This belief was confirmed as recently as November 1994, in a letter
written by Jonathan Menutti of the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service in Seoul. Wang &
Wang Brief, supra note 19, at Exhibit 3.
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puter Associates' apparent good faith and lack of notice of the trans-
action-based valuation policy, authorities commenced proceedings
against its Korean-American manager for customs fraud (a crime car-
rying a possible ten-year prison term) and imposed a substantial bill
for unpaid tariffs.78
The Korean government's failure to publish any rule, regulation,
or law notifying foreign importers of its importation policies with re-
spect to computer software may well be violative of the transparency
requirements of Article X79 of the GATT accord that provides:
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rul-
ings of gefieral application, made effective by any contracting party,
pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for cus-
toms purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges ... shall
be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments
and traders to become acquainted with them.... 2. No measure of
general application taken by any contracting party effecting an ad-
vance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an estab-
lished and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more
burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on im-
ports ... shall be enforced before such measure has been officially
published.... 3(a). Each contracting party shall administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
Paragraph (1) of Article X requires that the customs regulations of a
contracting party be sufficiently transparent so as to put foreign gov-
ernments and companies on notice of all procedures, tariffs and penal-
ties applicable to the importation of goods. Korea has not met this
requirement with respect to the importation of software, because it
has no published rules, regulations, or laws specifying that it charges a
duty on software content in addition to media.80 Moreover, because
78. IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 34-35; 1TAA Special 301 Submis-
sion, supra note 19, at 3; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 1-2.
79. The text of Article X of the original GATT of 1947 was incorporated without
change into the Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
Korea's failure to publish its software valuation policy may also be violative of Article
VII, Paragraph 5 of GATT, which states as follows:
The bases and methods for determining the value of products subject to duties or
other charges or restrictions based upon or regulated in any manner by value
should be stable and should be given sufficient publicity to enable traders to esti-
mate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the value for customs purposes.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Lack of transparency is a common
problem with Korean Customs' procedures, because there is a paucity of published rules or
regulations concerning the importation of goods. Glain, South Korea's Cutting Edge is
Dulled, supra note 14 ("Key regulations are often unpublished and selectively enforced.").
In fact, even Korea's own trade officials recognize their import laws could be more clearly
stated: "When we announce a plan, it isn't detailed ... Our government doesn't under-
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Korea's prior practice was to solely levy duties on software media,8'
the government should have been required to officially publish any
change in its valuation of software constituting a "new or more bur-
densome requirement ... on imports," before such a change could be
enforced under paragraph (2) of Article X. Even Korea's domestic
laws imply that no government regulations will become effective until
they are published.82 For instance, Article 53 of the Korean Constitu-
tion and Article 13 of the Act Concerning Publication of Laws and
Regulations generally provide that Presidential decrees and agency
regulations become effective 20 days after promulgation (i.e., official
publication) to the public. 83 Lastly, even if the Korean Customs Act
could be interpreted as authorizing the imposition of duties on
software content,84 Korea's inconsistent application of such a policy,
coupled with the confusion to importers posed by the unique nature of
software, may necessitate the publication of separate software valua-
tion rules under the reasonableness provision of paragraph (3) of Ar-
ticle X.
C. Effect of Transaction-Based Valuation on Software Importers
The economic effect of Korea's transaction-based valuation pol-
icy on foreign software importers is substantial, because there is a sig-
nificant difference in cost between software media and the total
transaction value of software (media plus content).85 For companies
stand clearly what the new [policies] should be." Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with
Korea, supra note 4 (quoting an official from the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Lack of transparency permits Korea's bureaucrats a great deal of discretion to disfavor an
importer depending upon whether they want to promote a foreign or a domestic company.
Telephone Interview with Christina Lund, Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive (Jan. 4, 1995).
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Korean Customs disputes this asser-
tion. Clearly, if Korea has always maintained a transaction-based valuation policy, it was
known to few, as it was not set forth in any published law, rule, or regulation and it was
only sporadically and arbitrarily applied. Id. Moreover, standard international practice
prior to the effective date of the GATT Customs Valuation Code was to value only the
media component of software, in accordance with the 1950 Brussels Definition of Value.
Korea presumably followed this practice as a signatory of the Brussels Agreement. If it
subsequently altered its policy upon the enactment of the GATT Valuation Code, it did not
do so publicly.
82. IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 38; Wang & Wang Brief, supra
note 19, at 7.
83. IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 38; Wang & Wang Brief, supra
note 19, at 7.
84. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
85. See Borking, supra note 50, at 13 (observing that transaction-based valuation will
result in a "substantial increase" in customs duties imposed on imported software, "a de-
velopment [which] was neither foreseen nor intended and clashes with the basis of the
GATr.").
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importing a large volume of software into Korea, this difference may
amount to tens of thousands of dollars in customs duties per year. A
natural corollary of this increase in cost to importers is the inflation of
the market prices of foreign software programs to Korean custom-
ers,8 6 making such programs less competitive than more reasonably
priced domestic products.
Another detrimental effect of this new valuation policy is that it is
likely to increase incentives for end-user software piracy, because
price inflation will encourage end-users to illegally copy, rather than
purchase, imported software programs.8 7 End-user piracy is already a
major problem in Korea. Indeed, the country has been on the United
States Trade Representative's Priority Watch List since 1992 due to its
failure to adequately enforce foreign intellectual property rights.88 In
1994 alone, end-user software piracy resulted in losses to the U.S.
computer software industry of approximately U.S. $313 million, more
than seven times the losses suffered by the motion picture, book, and
music industries combined.89 Korea's poor record on intellectual
property rights ("IPR") protection in the software industry appears
inconsistent with its current campaign of cracking down on software
importers for alleged violations of its transaction-based valuation pol-
icy, particularly Computer Associates, whose Korean-American direc-
tor was criminally indicted for evasion of customs duties. 90 Criminal
86. IIPA Submission, supra note 50, at 51. The increased price also raises the overall
production costs of the Korean end-user.
87. Id. at 51-52.
88. 1d. at 49. See also Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR An-
nouncement and Fact Sheets on Decisions Affecting Foreign Government Procurement, In-
tellectual Property Protection, and U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Pact, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 722, 725 (May 4, 1994) (while Korea has made improvements in intellectual prop-
erty protection, it has remained on the USTR's "Priority Watch List" due to lingering
concerns over its "inadequate intellectual property laws" and insufficient resources for en-
forcement and prosecution of piracy "especially for software").
89. IIPA Submission, supra note 50, at 49. The book, motion picture, and music in-
dustries reported an additional $43 million loss due to piracy in Korea. ld.
Improvements in intellectual property rights protection have been slow to occur in the
software industry because Korean officials are often reluctant to conduct raids on large
domestic companies that are the most serious infringers. Telephone Interview with Jim
Zumwalt, supra note 23. See also James M. West, Legal Recourse against Software Piracy
in South Korea: Progress, Problems and Prospects 7 (Nov. 1993) (attached as Exhibit 9 to
IACC Special 301 Submission) (as of 1993, criminal prosecutions for software piracy
against large end-users were "few and far between," and those prosecutions that were initi-
ated were thought to be "public relations exercise[s] to deflect trade sanctions"); 1995
COUNTRY REPoRTs, supra note 10, at 73 (indicating that while software piracy in Korea is
widespread, authorities have conducted few raids of large end-users). Indeed, according to
the IHPA, the Korean government's current attitude toward software piracy "can best be
described as passive cooperation." IIPA Submission, supra note 50, at 50.
90. IACC Special 301 Submission, supra note 19, at 34,39; Wang & Wang Brief, supra
note 19, at 8.
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indictments against major domestic IPR infringers in Korea are rare,
and the burden of proof required for conviction is onerous.91
Lastly, the apparent willingness of Korean Customs authorities to
impose retroactive civil and criminal penalties on importers for failing
to comply with its non-transparent requirements, as demonstrated in
the Computer Associates' incident, may have an in terrorem effect on
other importers who in the past paid duties only on the value of
software media.92 These other companies may decide that it is wiser
to settle with customs than risk criminal indictment of their employees
and the uncertainty of a court battle that may be disruptive to busi-
ness and create future tensions with government officials. Companies
will undoubtedly pass the costs of any such settlement on to Korean
customers, again making imported programs less competitive, and in-
creasing incentives for end-user piracy.
In sum, the economic effects of Korea's transaction-based valua-
tion policy, its exacerbation of the software piracy problem, and the in
terrorem effect of retroactive actions against importers, when taken in
combination, pose a substantial barrier to market access for Ameri-
can-made computer software.
II. Withholding Taxes on Software Revenue
In addition to charging customs duties on the full transaction
value of imported computer software, the Korean government takes a
second bite at the apple by levying withholding taxes on income gen-
erated from domestic sales of the same merchandise. 93 This double
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; IACC Special 301 Submission, supra
note 19, at 39; Wang & Wang Brief, supra note 19, at 8; West, supra note 89, at 7, 10.
According to Dr. West, as of late 1993, Korean prosecutors' attitude toward major end-
user infringers was "conspicuously passive... [they] declin[ed] to open investigations or to
conduct criminal raids unless the probable cause evidence submitted by the complainant
[was] virtually conclusive." West, supra note 89, at 10.
92. See Software Publishers Association, 1995 "SPECIAL 301" REVIEW: Policies
And Practices of Foreign Countries Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, at Appendix 2,
p.7 (submitted to the Office of the United States Trade Representative) ("the prospect of
criminal charges and imprisonment creates a climate of fear and uncertainty that discour-
ages the importation of furnished packages of U.S. software [into Korea].").
93. WALTER H. DIAMOND, FOREIGN TAX AND TRADE BRIEFS: INTERNATIONAL
WITHHOLDING TAX TREATY GUIDE, at Far East-24 87 et seq. (Matthew Bender 1990).
Royalties derived from the sale or licensing of software are subject to a 15% withholding
tax plus a 1.125% resident surtax in Korea, under the terms of the U.S.-Korea Tax Treaty.
See id.; Kee & Jeong, supra note 58, at 7; Fred M. Greguras & Moon Sung Lee, Computer
Software License Agreements, 14 E. Asian Exec. Rep. (E. Asian Exec. Rep., Inc.) No. 6, at
20 (June 15, 1992). This is to be distinguished from the 10% rate applicable to royalties on
copyrighted works, which does not apply to software. Greguras & Lee, supra; DIAMOND,
supra, at Far East-25 n.22. Software is also subject to a 10% value-added tax (VAT) in
Korea. Greguras & Lee, supra.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
taxation imposes a heavy additional cost burden on foreign software
companies. 94
The question whether it is appropriate to charge withholding
taxes on income generated by the "sale" or "license" of computer
software is currently the subject of some controversy in a number of
countries, including the United States.95 Because the United States is
a leader in the high technology and information industries96, its deci-
sion on this issue will undoubtedly have a great influence on the ac-
tions of many foreign taxing authorities. Moreover, the author
believes that concerns of equity and fairness dictate that the United
States should formally rule on the withholding tax question before it
can reasonably request the Korean government to change its own pol-
icies. Accordingly, this Note argues that for purposes of both the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Korean National Tax Ad-
ministration ("K-NTA"), it is inappropriate to charge withholding
taxes on the revenue generated from the transfer of most computer
software products. This Note will first address this issue from the per-
spective of U.S. tax principles to provide a basis for applying this argu-
ment to Korean law.
A. Analysis of U.S. Tax Principles
(1) Characterization of Software Revenue
At the heart of the withholding tax controversy is whether reve-
nue derived from certain software transactions should be character-
ized as business profits from the sale of merchandise, or royalties from
the licensing of intangible copyrighted works.97 Under sections
94. When the withholding and value-added taxes are combined with the current 8%
customs duty payable on the transaction value of software, the importer is faced with a
total tax burden of over 34%. Greguras & Lee, supra note 93.
95. See Gary D. Sprague, Current International Tax Problems in the Software Industry
1-3 (Baker & Mackenzie, Palo Alto, CA) [hereinafter Sprague, Current International Tax
Problems] (on file with Thn HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL) (indicating that the National Office
of the Internal Revenue Service has yet to formally adopt a position on this issue); Richard
L. DeLap, Pre-Packaged Software: Royalties or Sales of Goods?, 21 INT'L TAX J. No. 3, at
1, 2 (Summer 1995) (same).
96. Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 604 (citing International Data Flow: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information and Individual Rights of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 36 (1980)).
97. For a thorough analysis of this question, see John M. Peterson, Jr., Firm Proposes
Ruling on Tax Treatment of Income from Softwar Transactions, 91 TAx NoTEs TODAY,
Nov. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, TNT File [hereinafter Peterson, Firm
Proposes Ruling] (reprinting a letter to the Dept. of the Treasury from the law firm of
Baker & Mackenzie, proposing issuance of a revenue ruling on the characterization of
software revenue for federal income tax purposes). See also Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at
10 (briefly discussing characterization in connection with an analysis of Korea's tax poli-
cies); Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Commentary on Article 12
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881(a)(1) and 1442(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, a 30 percent tax
is withheld from certain U.S. source "fixed or determinable annual or
periodical income, paid to foreign corporations, to the extent such in-
come is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness within the United States."98 Income derived from software
transactions that can be characterized as "licensing" qualifies as royal-
ties that are taxable "fixed or determinable annual or periodical in-
come" under these provisions. 99 Conversely, income from software
transactions that is characterized as "sales" of copyrighted merchan-
dise qualifies as business profits that are not taxable under sections
Concerning the Taxation of Royalties, 12, C(12)-4 (Updated Sept. 1, 1992) [hereinafter
OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary] ("[w]hether payments received as considera-
tion for computer software may be classified as royalties poses difficult problems but is a
matter of considerable importance in view of the rapid development of computer technol-
ogy in recent years and the extent of transfers of such technology across national
borders.").
Peterson cogently argues that revenue from most end-user software transactions
should be characterized as business profits from the sale of goods, which are not subject to
withholding tax. Peterson, supra. However, this proposal has met with fierce opposition
from some software companies, most notably IBM, which claims that license characteriza-
tion is essential to the enforcement of intellectual property rights under copyright law and
its contractual user agreements. Ronald A. Pearlman & Deanna J. Hamilton, IBM Op-
poses Ruling on Computer Software, 92 TAX NOTEs TODAY, Aug. 13, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, TNT File [hereinafter Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Ruling
on Computer Software]. IBM also asserts that a general ruling on characterization would
be inappropriate given the great variety of license arrangements and terms that may be
used in software transactions. Id. Peterson addressed these concerns in a second letter to
the Department of the Treasury, see John M. Peterson, Jr., Software Companies Battle IBM
Over Characterization of Software Revenue, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 1, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, TNT File [hereinafter Peterson, Software Companies Battle IBM]
(arguing that tax characterization should have no bearing on the enforcement of the legal
rights and obligations of the parties and that a "common set of facts" inherent in software
transactions makes the issuance of a general revenue ruling feasible). This was followed by
a counterattack from IBM. See Ronald A. Pearlman & Deanna J. Hamilton, IBM Opposes
Sale Treatment of Software Licensing Transactions, 92 TAx NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, TNT File [hereinafter Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Op-
poses Sale Treatment] (stressing the factual variations among license transactions and the
purported inadequacy of Baker & Mackenzie's proposed revenue ruling). Though the dis-
pute between IBM and the software companies represented by Baker & Mackenzie was
apparently resolved by an amendment to the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty (which the latter
companies had lobbied for), the characterization question has yet to be formally answered
by the IRS or the Treasury Department. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 14 n.17.
98. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97; I.R.C. §§ 881(a)(1), 1442(a); 1
JOEL D. KuNTz & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AI-60, Al-67
(1992); John J. Cross III, Taxation of Intellectual Property in International Transactions, 8
VA. TAX REv. 553, 563, 574 (Winter 1989).
99. Cross, supra note 98, at 574 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-2(a)(1)); Peterson, Firm
Proposes Ruling, supra note 97. I.R.C. § 861(a)(4) further provides that royalties paid for
the right to use a copyright in the U.S. qualifies as U.S. source income. Peterson, Firm
Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
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881(a)(1) and 1442(a). 100 Whether a transaction is characterized as a
"license"''1 or a "sale" should depend upon the rights actually con-
ferred to the end-user in a transfer of the product, rather than upon
the fact that the transfer is made pursuant to a license agreement. 0 2
Indeed, under U.S. tax principles, "[it is well established that whether
a transaction is a sale or a license for tax purposes depends on the
substance of the transaction, not on the form or the label accorded the
transaction by the parties." 103
Applying this substance-over-form analysis, the transfer of cer-
tain pre-packaged, "off the shelf" software products to an end-user for
a fixed, lump-sum price should qualify as a sale of goods not subject to
the withholding tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. °4 Ac-
cording to Rev. Rul. 55-540105, a transaction may be characterized as a
sale
"If the sum of the specified 'rentals' over a relatively short part of
the expected useful life of the equipment approximates the price at
which the equipment could have been acquired by purchase at the
100. Cross, supra note 98, at 563 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-2(a)(3)); Peterson, Firm
Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
101. A license may be defined as a transfer of "less than substantially all of the bundle
of rights representing an item of intellectual property for the legal life of the intellectual
property." Cross, supra note 98, at 572. With respect to computer software, a license is
created by a transfer of less than substantially all of the copyright owner's interest in the
software copyright. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
102. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97. Almost all software transfers are
subject to some form of license agreement, the purpose of which is to either (a) document
the rights granted to the distributor/reseller (e.g., in a reproduction license) and/or (b) set
forth terms protecting the intellectual property rights of the copyright owner (e.g., in the
standard end-user transaction). Id. When a license agreement supplements the copyright
law, and does not transfer any rights in the copyright itself, thereby failing in substance to
create a license, it is important to apply the substance-over-form principle to determine
proper revenue characterization. Id. (emphasis added); see also DeLap, supra note 95, at 1
(noting that sales of pre-packaged software may improperly be subject to withholding tax
"[biased solely on theform of the transaction (i.e., the existence of a 'license agreement')")
(emphasis added). Cf. Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97
("a determination of tax ownership is 'a question of fact which must be ascertained by the
written agreements, which are read in light of the attending facts and circumstances."')
(quoting TAM 9237045 (May 6, 1992)).
103. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435
U.S. 561, 573-74 (1978), Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891)); see also
Sprague, supra note 95, at 2 ("Under U.S. tax principles ... the economic substance of a
transaction should prevail to determine the character of revenue rather than the legal form
involved."); Rev. Rul. 55-540, infra note 105, at 41 §4. Cf. Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM
Opposes Ruling on Computer Software, supra note 97 (listing the ownership attributes set
forth by the Court in Lyon that are relevant to a determination of whether a transaction is
a lease or a sale).
104. Sprague, supra note 95, at 2; Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
105. Rev. Rul. 55-540, C.B. 1955-2, 39. Revenue Ruling 55-540 discusses lease versus
sales characterization with respect to equipment used in a trade or business. Id.
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time of entering into the agreement ... and the lessee may continue
to use the equipment for an additional period or periods approxi-
mating its remaining estimated useful life for relatively nominal or
token payments. 106
In certain basic software transactions, an end-user will purchase a
pre-packaged software product from a retailer or distributor for a
one-time, fixed fee. 07 The software typically contains a form license
agreement, to which the purchaser assents by opening the package or
loading the program onto a computer. 10 8 Although these licensing
agreements may differ from one manufacturer to the next,109 they
generally provide that a purchaser has the right to use the software in
his/her home or business for the duration of its useful life. The pur-
chaser, however, is not entitled to copy the software (except possibly
for archival purposes, or if otherwise necessary to make the program
perform its stated function), decompile, sublicense, rent, lease or re-
verse engineer it, or use it on more than one computer. 110 Thus, for
purposes of Rev. Rul. 55-540, the end-user obtains the right to use a
software program for the duration of its useful life, and pays a price
up-front that is commensurate with the value of that right."' The fact
that the use is restricted to a limited degree by the terms of the license
agreement does not alter the tax characterization of the transaction as
a sale, because no transfer of rights in the underlying copyright occurs
that would in substance create a license." 2
106. Cf Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97 ("the rele-
vant indicia of tax ownership may include factors beyond those relied upon by the Rev.
Rul. 55-540 analysis").
107. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
108. Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Ruling on Computer Software, supra note
97.
109. Id.
110. Peterson, Software Companies Battle IBM, supra note 97. This description is
somewhat oversimplified, but should be adequate for purposes of tax analysis. Id
111. Id.; see also Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
112. See DeLap, supra note 95, at 1 (although pre-packaged software is usually sold
pursuant to a standard license agreement, the agreement does not confer on the buyer any
right to sub-license the product. Accordingly, "[firom an economic point of view ... this
license essentially represents a sale of goods."); Peterson, Software Companies Battle IBM,
supra note 97 (arguing that software transactions are more akin to sales than licenses
where "[e]nd-users pay for the use of the copyrighted article for its useful life, not for a
license to exploit the copyright by copying the program for resale or for transfer to non-
paying users."). This type of transfer is analogous to transactions involving other copy-
righted articles, such as books, where the purchaser pays a set fee for the right to perpetu-
ally use the article, but does not obtain the right to reproduce or otherwise commercially
exploit the underlying copyright. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97. Insofar
as transfers of items like books are treated as sales for federal income tax purposes, so too
should transfers of pre-packaged "off the shelf" software. Id.
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Applicability of sale treatment under Rev. Rul..55-540 should ex-
tend to more complex software transactions as well. 1 3 Indeed, in an
industry ever striving to increase efficiency and lower costs, many al-
ternative arrangements have been developed to distribute software to
large, high volume end-users, such as corporations and government
agencies. 114
One alternative is site licensing, whereby the customer pays an
upfront fee for one copy of a program and the limited right to make
additional copies for internal on-site use only."15 Where a customer
has hundreds of on-site users, site licensing permits the software seller
to provide programs in a manner more efficient than delivery of indi-
vidual program copies to each user.1 6 As with more simplified
software transactions, however, the customer still pays a fixed fee for
the right to use the software for the duration of its useful life.117
Moreover, although the customer does obtain a limited right to
reproduce the software, copies that are only for on-site use may not be
sold or transferred to third parties."18 Thus, the right to control and
exploit the underlying copyright remains with the copyright owner. 19
This fact is reflected in the purchase price of the software, which is
substantially less than it would be if the customer purchased the right
to exploit the copyright.120 Indeed, site licensing often costs less than
113. See id For a detailed argument that sale characterization should not apply to
more complex software transactions, such as bulk license transactions, see Pearlman &
Hamilton, IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97 (arguing that factors such as the
bulk licensee's acquisition of the right to reproduce program copies and its waiver of the
right to alienate such copies weigh in favor of license characterization). Pearlman and
Hamilton also argue that IBM's willingness under certain circumstances to allow a cus-
tomer to copy its pre-packaged programs at no extra charge (e.g., when the customer's
copies were destroyed by fire, or when necessary to facilitate the customer's transition to a
new program) demonstrates that it "is not in the business of selling physical program cop-
ies .... [but is] in the business of granting customers a right to use licensed computer
programs." Id Of course, one might also surmise that the customers in question are large
corporate or government entities, and that IBM's generosity has more to do with good
business practices (i.e., promoting goodwill and keeping the customer from switching to
another software provider) than with licensing per se.
114. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
115. Id Copies may be reproduced onto multiple computer disks, or, more commonly,
by electronic transmission to the users' computers. Id
116. Id.; see also Sprague, supra note 95, at 2 ("from the perspective of the software
supplier, a site license is merely an alternative method of delivering its product, which also
could be accomplished by delivering numerous copies of the product package.").
117. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97. Conceptual difficulties may arise
when new on-site users are added, requiring the payment of additional fees. Id However,
this transaction, in substance, is no different than one in which new users are physically
provided with their own separate program copies for a fixed, up-front fee. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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the price the customer would have paid had the seller delivered indi-
vidual program copies to each on-site user.121
Another arrangement commonly made for large-scale end-users
to promote efficiency and lower costs is the sale of a single program
copy to a customer for use on a local area network ("LAN").'22 In
this type of transaction, the customer typically pays an upfront fee
that covers the cost of a single copy plus the number of additional
users who will access the program.123 Selling a single program copy
for network use is more efficient and makes more sense than selling
multiple copies for each user in the customer's business (indeed, the
latter approach would partially defeat the purpose of networking alto-
gether). As with site licensing, the end-user still pays a fixed fee for
the perpetual use of the product with no accompanying right to com-
mercially exploit the underlying copyright. 24 Thus, while LAN end-
user transactions differ from more basic software sales, this difference
is one of form, not substance.
Pre-packaged end-user transactions, network transactions, and
site licensing should be distinguished from arrangements in which a
purchaser obtains the right to exploit the underlying software copy-
right for resale purposes. In the latter transaction, a sale does not
occur unless the copyright owner sells "all substantial rights," includ-
ing the rights to exclusively and perpetually use, copy, and sell the
software, to the purchaser. 25 Where a copyright owner transfers less
than the complete interest in his or her copyright, the transaction is
considered a license subject to the withholding tax provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. 126 One example of such a transaction occurs
when a foreign software company licenses to a domestic company the
non-exclusive right to reproduce its software from master disks for
121. Id. The reduced price may reflect a volume discount coupled with the cost-savings
of delivering the software by way of the site license arrangement. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97
("The customer pays IBM a base charge for the right to use the LAN Server program
PLUS an additional license fee for each existing workstation in the customer's computer
network.").
124. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97. But cf. Pearlman & Hamilton,
IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97 (stating that "[s]uch a usage-based fee, even if
paid as a one-time charge, is a classic illustration of a license arrangement.").
125. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97; Rev. Rul. 75-202, C.B. 1975-1 170;
Rev. Rul. 60-226, C.B. 1960-1 26. Moreover, even if all substantial rights are transferred, if
payment from buyer to seller is contingent upon the buyer's use of the copyright, the trans-
action will still be subject to withholding tax under I.R.C. § 881(a)(4). Peterson, Firm Pro-
poses Ruling, supra note 97. Section 881(a)(4) provides that "gains from the sale of a
copyright or any interest in a copyright are subject to withholding to the extent such gains
are from payments which are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
copyright." Id.
126. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
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packaging and resale to domestic end-users.127 In return, the domestic
company pays the foreign company a percentage of income from the
resale of the software, rather than a fixed fee up-front.128 The transfer
of the right to reproduce the software for resale from the foreign com-
pany to the domestic company is a transaction in the copyright it-
self.129 Moreover, because the right to reproduce is non-exclusive,
there has not been a transfer of "all substantial rights," and the ar-
rangement would be characterized as a license. 30 The key distinction
between the license arrangement and the aforementioned end-user,
network, and site licensing transactions is that the former involves the
transfer of an interest in a copyright, whereas the latter involves the
transfer of a copyrighted article.131
In sum, under United States tax principles, revenue derived from
pre-packaged, network, and site-license transactions, where there is
no accompanying right to reproduce the software for resale or to
otherwise commercially exploit the underlying copyright, should be
characterized as business profits from the sale of goods and not sub-
ject to federal withholding tax. It is true that software itself consists of
copyrightable intellectual property,132 but it is nonetheless trans-
formed into a copyrighted article when it is stored on carrier media
and sold in the stream of commerce. 33 This merchandise characteri-
zation should not change when software is purchased in a site license
or LAN network transaction, insofar as the limited right to reproduce
granted to the purchaser is solely for purposes of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, and there is no transfer of an interest in the copyright
itself.134
127. Id.; see also OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, supra note 97, Par. 13, at
C(12)-5 (an author's transfer of part of his rights in software to a third party for purposes
of commercial exploitation gives rise to license characterization).
128. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
129. Ild.
130. Id.
131. Id, see also Peterson, Software Companies Battle IBM, supra note 97 (discussing
the difference between the underlying copyright and the copyrighted article). The IRS
apparently adopted the "copyright" versus "copyrighted article" distinction in TAM
9231002 (Aug. 3, 1992), determining that a taxpayer's extended maintenance contracts for
software involved a "sale or other disposition within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-
5(a)." Id.; but cf Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Opposes Sale Treatment, supra note 97 (ar-
guing that the Service's analysis in TAM 9231002 was flawed). The distinction has also
been made in the foreign sales corporation context. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra
note 97.
132. See OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, supra note 97, at C(12)-5 ("The
rights in computer software are a form of intellectual property.").
133. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text; Pearlman & Hamilton, IBM Op-
poses Sale Treatment, supra note 97 ("We do not dispute that a physical computer program
copy is a copyrighted article.").
134. Peterson, Firm Proposes Ruling, supra note 97.
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(2) OECD Model Tax Convention135
The argument that revenue from most pre-packaged, network,
and site-license transactions should be characterized as business prof-
its from the sale of goods is consistent with the approach taken by the
Fiscal Affairs Committee of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD") in its Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital, revised as of September, 1992.136 According
to the OECD Commentary on Article 12 of the Convention:
Transfers of rights [in software] occur in many different ways rang-
ing from the alienation of the entire rights to the sale of a product
which is subject to restrictions on the use to which it is
put.... [where] the acquisition of the software [is] ... for the per-
sonal or business use of the purchaser.... [t]he payment will then
fall to be dealt with as commercial income in accordance with Arti-
cles 7 or 14. It is of no relevance that the software is protected by
copyright or that there may be restrictions on the use to which the
purchaser can put it.137
These principles should apply regardless of whether a sale involves the
transfer of pre-packaged software to a single end-user, the transfer of
a master program copy for internal on-site reproduction, or use on a
LAN network, since in each situation the software is purchased for
personal or business use.138 In fact, while the Convention acknowl-
edges that "difficulties can arise" when there is a partial transfer of
rights subject to geographical limits (e.g., a site license), the payment
of a usage-based fee (e.g., for a LAN server), or a substantial lump-
sum payment, it states that such transactions generally give rise to
commercial income or capital gains, not royalties. 139 The Convention
also provides that where the copyright owner transfers part of his in-
terest in the copyright itself to a third party for purposes of commer-
cial exploitation, the transaction is a license and the income derived
135. The OECD was established in 1961 for the purpose of encouraging international
"economic progress" and trade, and is comprised of 24 developed nations, including the
U.S., Japan, Canada, and several European countries. McGee & Yoon, supra note 2, at 4
n.39. Although the Model Tax Convention is not binding on OECD members, it
establishes a standard for taxation that is influential in shaping domestic policy. DeLap,
supra note 95, at 2.
136. Sprague, supra note 95, at 2, 3; DeLap, supra note 95, at 2; Kee & Jeong, supra
note 58.
137. OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, supra note 97, at 1 12 & 14, C(12)-5
(emphasis added).
138. Peterson, Software Companies Battle IBM, supra note 97; Sprague, supra note 95,
at 2, 3; Kee & Jeong, supra note 58.
139. OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, supra note 97, 15 & 16, at C(12)-
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therefrom is a royalty.140 Income from the transfer of a complete in-
terest in the copyright, however, is not a royalty.141
B. The Korean Approach
Although Korea is not yet a member of the OECD, it hopes tojoin the organization in 1996 and has officially stated that it will follow
the OECD guidelines for international taxation.142 However, Korea's
policies and practices relating to the imposition of withholding taxes
on software revenue draw this statement into question, because Korea
has habitually rejected the application of nontaxable sale characteriza-
tion to most computer software transactions.143
(1) 1993 Guidelines and 1994 Supplemental Guidelines
According to Guidelines issued by the K-NTA in September of
1993, virtually all types of software transfers involved the payment of
royalties subject to withholding tax. 44 Not surprisingly, payments
made in consideration for the right to reproduce and/or distribute
software were deemed taxable royalties,145 consistent with the idea
that such transactions were in the copyright itself, rather than in the
copyrighted article. The Guidelines, however, went further to indicate
that certain transactions in the copyrighted article (termed transac-
tions "to acquire know-how inherent in the software"'146) were also
taxable. Such transactions were subject to withholding tax when, for
instance, payment was determined by the geographic limits of the
transaction or the frequency of use or volume of products produced;
the importer was required to keep the software confidential and was
140. Id. at 13, at C(12)-5; Sprague, supra note 95, at 3; Peterson, Software Companies
Battle IBM, supra note 97; Kee & Jeong, supra note 58.
141. OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, supra note 97, at 15, C(12)-6.
142. J.Y. Lee & R.M. Donaldson, South Korea Moves to Ease Tax Rules Governing
Foreign Companies, 9 TAX NoTFs INT'L 1711, 1711 (Dec. 5, 1994); John Turro, Tax Treaties:
U.S. and Korea Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Treaty Interpretation, 8 TAX
NoTEs INV'L 562, 562-563 (Feb. 28, 1994); Gary D. Sprague, Letter to the Editor: Korea
Expected to Reverse Position on Withholding Tax on Software Products, 8 TAX NoTEs INT'L
453, 453 (Feb. 14, 1994).
143. See Gary D. Sprague, Korea: New Tax Guidelines for Packaged Software, 5
Software Taxation Letter 10, 10 (March 1994) [hereinafter Sprague, New Tax Guidelines]
(Korea's 1994 internal Guidelines "impose ... withholding tax on virtually all forms of
packaged software product revenue paid to non-residents."); Baik & Choi, supra note 57,
at 11, 15 (observing that withholding taxes were imposed on most software transfers under
the 1993 Guidelines and that the current Guidelines appear to tax virtually all software
other than "canned" programs).
144. Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 10; Baik & Choi, supra note 57,
at 11.
145. Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 10; Baik & Choi, supra note 57,
at 11.
146. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 11.
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not able to alienate the program to a third party without permission;
or the software was customized or sufficiently "high end" to be con-
sidered to contain know-how. 147 Although the 1993 Guidelines did
expressly exempt transfers of standard pre-packaged software from
taxation, I48 this exemption was substantially limited by a requirement
that the software not exceed the technical level of programs that could
be developed in Korea.149 Tax officials in the field frequently took
advantage, of this limitation to levy taxes on most pre-packaged
software payments. so
The K-NTA issued Supplemental Guidelines in June of 1994 to
clarify the provisions of its earlier Guidelines as a result of political
pressure from the U.S. and software industry complaints about Ko-
rea's aggressive tax policies.' 5' These Supplemental Guidelines ex-
empted pre-packaged, "off-the-shelf" software from Korean
withholding tax, provided that it did not contain "know-how" as de-
fined under Korean law, any applicable tax treaty, or Article 12 of the
OECD Model Convention. 52 This position was consistent on its face
with a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") signed by Korea
and the U.S. in prior months, in which Korea pledged to follow
OECD standards in interpreting the U.S.-Korea Tax Treaty and in
treating software revenue as business profits not subject to withhold-
ing tax.153 However, Korea subsequently denied that the MOU con-
tained any such agreement on its part and Korean tax officials
continued to exercise broad discretion in determining which software
products generated taxable income.154
(2) 1994 Basic Rules
Korea eventually consolidated its two prior Guidelines on the is-
sue of software taxation in its revisions to the Basic Rules of the Cor-
147. Id.; Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 10, 11.
148. The Guidelines also provided exemptions for bundled transactions (i.e., where
software is sold pre-installed in hardware), as long as they were made in accord with "com-
mon trade practices." Sprague, Current International Tax Problems, supra note 95, at app.
B, 9I C(3); Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 11-12.
149. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 11; Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143,
at 11.
150. Sprague, Current International Tax Problems, supra note 95, at 12.
151. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 12; see also Lee & Donaldson, supra note 60, at
1711-12.
152. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 12. The Guidelines listed specific products that
qualified for the tax break, so as to provide clear guidance to local tax officials. Id.
153. Thrro, supra note 142, at 562; Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 12;
Gary D. Sprague, Korea: Treasury Department Issues Memorandum on Treaty, 5 Software
Taxation Letter 26, 26-27 (April 1994) [hereinafter Sprague, Treasury Department].
154. Sprague, Treasury Department, supra note 153, at 27.
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porate Tax Law, which took effect in August, 1994 ("New Rules"). 155
According to the New Rules, consideration paid for the right to ex-
ploit a software copyright (including reproduction and distribution) is
still taxable as a royalty, as are payments made for software which
contains "know how."' 56 The presence of "know-how" is to be deter-
mined by the following criteria:
1. When a contractual obligation to preserve confidentiality
other than prohibition under the Copyright Law for illegal repro-
duction, etc. is imposed.
2. When the price of the software is determined on the basis of
the place, type of end users, frequency, productivity per period of
use of the software, or the amount of products manufactured or in-
formation processed by such software.
3. When source code (language arrangement which constitutes
the software program) of the software is provided.
4. When it is clear that the software contains technical informa-
tion which is not disclosed to the public and which is essential for
industrial reproduction of other products or production process.' 57
The New Rules exempted "shrink-wrapped" (i.e., pre-packaged)
software imported "without a separate license agreement," including
programs like DOS, Windows, Wordperfect, "and software for pur-
poses of entertainment/study, data processing, etc. sold to the general
public," bundled software, and some customized software from with-
holding tax.'5 8
On a superficial level, the New Rules regarding software taxation
are more liberal than their predecessors, insofar as they drop express
"know-how" distinctions between high-end and low-end software pro-
grams and the requirement that software be domestically produci-
ble.19 Nonetheless, several problems remain. First, the New Rules'
description of software exempted from withholding tax as "sold to the
general public," "without a separate license agreement," and the like,
is suggestive of the former limitations with respect to high-end pro-
grams and software that could not be produced in Korea. 60 The prac-
tical result of this language may be that all but the most basic
packaged software, even if purchased exclusively for home or business
use, is excluded from the "shrink-wrap" exception. Software that
155. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 12; Gary D. Sprague, Memorandum Re: New Reg-
ulations on Software Revenue Characterization I (Oct. 21, 1994) (addendum on Corporate
Tax Basic Rules § 6-1-13-55 (Aug. 1, 1994), unofficial translation, on file with TiE HAs-
TNGS LAw JOURNAL) [hereinafter Sprague, New Regulations] (Payments for Importing
Software to Foreign Legal Entities).
156. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 12.
157. Sprague, New Regulations, supra note 155.
158. It.
159. Id. at 1-2.
160. Id.
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does not qualify for "shrink-wrap" status is likely to be taxed under
the provision covering software that contains non-public technical in-
formation "essential for industrial reproduction of other products or
production process," even where the end-user is granted no right to
commercially exploit the underlying copyright. 161 To the extent the
New Rules allow taxation of revenue from all but the most basic
software transactions (and sometimes even those), they are inconsis-
tent with both the OECD Guidelines and internationally accepted
standards. 62
Second, the New Rules still appear to subject both LAN network
and site licensing transactions to withholding taxation, under the pro-
vision covering software whose price "is determined on the basis of
the place, type of end users, frequency, productivity per period of use
of the software, or the amount of products manufactured or informa-
tion processed by such software. ' 163 The New Rules thus fail to dis-
tinguish between transactions involving a transfer of the right to
exploit the underlying copyright, which may be taxed, and transac-
tions that are only in the copyrighted article, which should not be
taxed.
Conclusion
There are several steps the Korean government can take to bring
itself in line with international standards for software taxation and the
free trade principles espoused by the GATT and WTO Agreement.
With respect to customs valuation, the Korean government has re-
cently revealed plans to revise the tariff rate for computer software
from eight percent to zero percent as early as January 1996.164 This
change will make software a duty free item in Korea, as it is in most
other developed nations.' 65 However, while a reduction to a zero per-
cent rate will be beneficial to importers, and is clearly a step in the
161. Baik & Choi, supra note 57, at 15. This provision has already been broadly inter-
preted in the field to include certain application software and industry-specific software.
Id.
162. See Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 12 ("Korea's application of
its international tax rules notoriously has violated internationally accepted understandings
of the meaning of tax treaties. Assessing withholding tax on packaged software revenue
also is contrary to the stated OECD position on this issue.").
163. Sprague, New Regulations, supra note 155.
164. See Starting in January Next Year, Tariffs to be Abolished on Imported Software-
Intended to Lift Cost Burden that has been Assessed on Development of New Software
Products, CHOSUN DAILY NEWSPAPER, May 19, 1995 (unofficial translation, on file with
the HAsrINGs LAW JOURNAL); Government Pursuing Zero-Tariff for Imported Software,
Indicating that Sufficient Tax Revenue has been Collected-Expected to be Finally Settled
Next Month, SEOUL ECONOMIC DAILY, May 30, 1995 (unofficial translation, on file with
the HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL).
165. See supra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
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right direction, it fails to resolve the underlying valuation problem.166
Importers will presumably still be required to report software values
on customs declarations, and may remain subject to penalties for in-
complete or incorrect entries based on their ignorance of Korea's val-
uation policy.167 More importantly, there is no sign that the
government plans to drop its prosecution of companies like Computer
Associates and its Korean-American manager for failing to comply
with a valuation policy of which that they were not aware. Indeed, if
Korea continues to pursue retroactive actions for purported customs
violations that pre-date the enactment of the revised tariff schedule,
other companies may find their operations similarly jeopardized.
Lastly, given Korea's track record with respect to import procedures,
there is no indication that the new duty-free requirement will be con-
sistently and fairly implemented. In the absence of clear guidelines
concerning valuation, it is entirely possible that lower level customs
officials will arbitrarily exercise discretion in levying tariffs or impos-
ing penalties on software importers. One need only look at the exam-
ple of Japan, which encountered strikingly similar difficulties in the
mid 1980s.168
The above problems can be resolved in a number of ways. First,
the Korean government should publish a ruling clearly setting forth its
policy with respect to the valuation of software for customs purposes.
Ideally, this ruling would establish that software data content is ex-
cluded from the computation of dutiable transaction value, and that
importers need only declare the value of carrier media on which such
data is stored.169 This would bring Korea's policy into alignment with
international standards for the customs valuation of software. Alter-
natively, should Korea reject such a change, the government should at
a minimum provide the business community with transparent notice
of its position, so that importers can adjust their practices accordingly.
Where possible, customs should cooperate with importers to resolve
166. Korea's consideration of a tariff reduction plan may well be a band-aid measure
designed to quell recent political pressure by members of Congress and the Office of the
United States Trade Representative. By making software duty free, the Korean govern-
ment may be trying to please the American government and American industries without
acknowledging that it lacks a transparent valuation policy and that past actions against
importers were, in fact, both arbitrary and unfair.
167. Theoretically, they may also be penalized if their estimates of the value of
software data are considered incorrect.
168. See Robertson, supra note 48 (discussing lower level Japanese customs agents'
arbitrary and inconsistent implementation of new regulations providing for the duty-free
import of software).
169. As a corollary to this, Customs authorities should also issue new directives to
lower level officials clearly setting forth the procedures to be implemented. This will avoid
the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law, which occurred in Japan.
See Robertson, supra note 48.
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remaining ambiguities and to avoid the unnecessary imposition of
penalties. Lastly, Korean Customs should not take any retroactive
civil or criminal action, and should cease all present actions, against
importers for acts allegedly committed prior to the date of publication
of notice of Korea's software policies.
Korea must also address its current position on software taxation.
The Korean taxing authority, the K-NTA, should cease levying with-
holding taxes upon transfers of pre-packaged software that prohibit
exploitation of the underlying copyright for commercial purposes, ir-
respective of the level of sophistication of such software, whether or
not it can be produced domestically, or whether it is sold to the gen-
eral public, a corporation, or a government entity. The K-NTA should
also exempt payments made in connection with site-license or net-
work transactions from taxation, to the extent that they involve home
or business use only and do not reflect a transfer of the right to com-
mercially exploit the software copyright. The Korean government has
formally pledged to follow the OECD guidelines concerning interna-
tional taxation,170 which generally characterize such transactions as
sales that are not subject to withholding tax.171 Moreover, there is no
basis in the OECD Convention for distinguishing, as current Korean
guidelines do, between high-end and low-end software products, or
products that are "essential for industrial reproduction of other prod-
ucts or production process. 1 72 Such distinctions are arbitrary and
likely to result in inconsistent and discriminatory enforcement of the
tax laws in the field.
As stated earlier, however, it is recommended that the United
States formally adopt a position with regard to the withholding tax
question before requesting any significant concessions from the Ko-
rean government in its treatment of software revenue. While the Na-
tional Office of the IRS has not yet issued any formal ruling on
revenue characterization, the actions of IRS agents in the field suggest
that it views income from pre-packaged software transactions as busi-
ness profits from the sale of goods. 173 Ironically, for a company that
does business abroad, this characterization can have the deleterious
effect of eliminating foreign source income tax credits that it would
have received for paying withholding taxes to foreign governments. 174
Indeed, IRS agents have begun to disallow such credits on the ground
170. See supra note 142.
171. See supra notes 137 & 139.
172. Sprague, New Regulations, supra note 155; see also OECD Model Tax Convention
Commentary, supra note 97, at 12 & 14, C(12)-5.
173. Sprague, Current International Tax Problems, supra note 95, at 3.
174. Sprague, Current International Tax Problems, supra note 95, at 3. Companies lose
the foreign tax credit because only royalty income derived from licensing a software copy-
right abroad qualifies as foreign source income. Id.
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that companies should not have to pay foreign withholding taxes on
pre-packaged software,175 suggesting that unless the companies ac-
tively contest imposition of the tax by the foreign taxing authority,
their payment is considered "voluntary" and is non-creditable in the
U.S.176 Thus, unilateral characterization by the IRS of pre-packaged
software transactions as sales may have the unfair result of increasing
the overall tax burden for software makers who do business in coun-
tries like Korea, that still impose withholding taxes on such transac-
tions. This underscores the need for foreign taxing authorities such as
the K-NTA to characterize software transfers in a manner consistent
with that of the IRS. Not only would uniform treatment be beneficial
for U.S. software interests, but it would also be fair, due to the fact
that foreign companies (including Korean software makers) exporting
software to the U.S. will rarely have to pay withholding taxes if the
U.S. formally adopts the "sale" characterization.
Clearly, none of the aforementioned changes in policy are likely
to occur in Korea absent pressure from the United States and other
trading partners. With respect to Korea's transaction-based software
valuation policy, though the U.S. government has made some effort to
address the concerns of American software manufacturers, more ac-
tion is necessary. Immediate political pressure on both the valuation
and withholding tax issues would be particularly appropriate given the
Korean government's current reconsideration of its software tariff
schedule and its bid to join the OECD in 1996.177 In addition, the
United States should consider initiating action under the Special 301
provisions of federal law if it is unable to reach a reasonable settle-
ment of these issues. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended, grants the President "broad authority to retaliate against
'unreasonable' and 'unjustifiable' acts, policies, or practices by foreign
countries which affect U.S. commerce," as brought to the attention of
the Trade Representative's office by interested parties. 178 Included
within the definition of "unreasonable" acts are discriminatory taxes
levied against U.S. products abroad. 179
175. Id.; see also Sprague, New Tax Guidelines, supra note 143, at 12 (some U.S. offi-
cials have stated that they will not allow a foreign tax credit to companies that fail to first
seek tax relief under the U.S. Korea tax treaty).
176. Sprague, Current International Tax Problems, supra note 95, at 4.
177. See Glain, U.S. Trade Dispute Simmers with Korea, supra note 4 (stating that "a
public row over trade will do little to help Korea's bid to join the [OECD]").
178. 1 PEMR BucK FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE
§ 19.01[1], at 19-2.
179. Id.
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